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The wheat industry is international in scope and involves many 
stages before the food products or by-products reach their final 
destination. Many intermediate marketing firms help transform wheat 
into products demanded by users and consumers. These firms perform 
the following functions: assembly, handling and storage, 
merchandising, transportation, grading and inspecting, cleaning, 
processing, and exporting. In order to perform these functions with a 
seasonally produced product, holding stocks of wheat and finished 
products is required. Firms holding stocks face the risk of changes 
in the value of inventories. Cash(spot) market transactions, which 
require immediate transfer of ownership from one individual to another 
do not allow risk transfer. Futures markets allow forward pricing and 
provide valuable risk bearing functions for managing inventory 
positions and planning, buying, selling, and other commercial 
activities. 
Hedging has a dual role of avoiding risk and locking in profit 
opportunities. The effect of changes in the overall level of prices 
is avoided. Futures transactions coupled with astute spot market 
transactions allow traders to take advantage of profitable 
merchandising opportunities. For a firm with volatile prices, large 
turnover and narrow margins, the avoidance of the risk from changes in 
1 
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price levels may mean the difference between the prospect of 
consistent profits as against the probability of a series of good 
years mixed with lean ones. In such businesses, most managers favor 
the greater stability of a hedged operation. This preference is 
reinforced when it is realized that new profit opportunities based on 
intelligent trading patterns are opened up to the hedger who thinks in 
terms of the difference between the cash price and futures price. 
This difference, known as the 11 basis 11 , has been described by notable 
authors such as Working (1948), Gray (1962), and Ikerd as being the 
11 key 11 to successful hedging. Therefore, it is imperative for those 
firms or individuals who wish to be efficient and effective in the 
market place, to have a full understanding of the basis and the 
economic factors which contribute to it. Information which expands or 
develops this knowledge should be useful to most, if not all, of those 
involved within the individual stages of the wheat industry. 
The economic variables which explain the Gulf-Kansas City 
Hard-red Winter wheat basis are identified and explained. Due to the 
importance of basis relationships to successful hedging, definitions 
and fundamentals of these concepts are explained first. 
The Importance of Hedging and Basis 
A hedging transaction has been defined as that of taking an equal 
(in volume), but opposite, position in the futures market as a hedger 
holds or expects to hold in the cash market. It is expected that the 
markets behave in such a way that any loss realized in one market may 
be offset by an equivalent gain in the other. Hedges may be of two 
types: short (selling) hedges and long (buying) hedges. The producer 
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of wheat is always a short hedger. He holds the cash crop (perhaps, 
even a growing crop) and sells futures to protect against falling 
prices and a subsequent wheat value loss. Processors may be either 
short hedgers or long hedgers. If higher cash prices are expected by 
their analysts, buying an equal futures contract provides protection 
against rising prices of cash wheat. This is a long hedge. 
Expectations of lower prices would entice selling of futures by 
processors, to offset long cash positions which would be a short 
hedge. 
The hedger is insured against price risk only if cash and futures 
prices move in predictable patterns. The literature (Meinken, 1955; 
Working 1934 and 1962; Gray 1962 and 1966), however, is replete with 
examples that indicate that cash and futures prices are not perfectly 
predictable. To the extent that bases are not predictable, hedged 
transactions are still risky. Researchers have been able to muster 
considerable support for the proposition that a change in cash prices 
frequently results in a similar change in futures prices, 
particularly if some unexpected event causes a dramatic price change. 
Hedged transactions are less risky because of the tendency for 
cash and futures prices to react similarly and also to converge to 
predictable levels due to arbitrage among buyers and sellers in the 
market place as the contract matures. The hedger is, in effect, 
passing to the speculator (market participant who accepts price level 
risks) the risk of price level changes and retaining the "basis risk 11 , 
that risk associated with the predictability of the basis. Cash and 
futures prices move in patterns such that their difference will change 
less abruptly than will ab~olute cash or futures prices. 
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This traditional risk transferal concept of hedging has evolved 
into a dynamic concept of risk management, which accents the 
maximization of an expected return given a particular level of risk. 
Hedging carried out to profit from movements in the basis, depends on 
understanding variation in the cash-futures spread. Each time this 
price spread differs from expectations when offsetting transactions 
are made, the hedge is not "perfect" and there is profit or loss to be 
made. Holbrook Working, in his 1953 article "Hedging Reconsidered", 
produced data on wheat prices that indicate that basis fluctuations 
are predictable. Many researchers, studying other commodities, have 
shown that the predictability of the basis is considerably better than 
that of the absolute cash/futures price levels. In addition, 
Working's conclusions provided possible motivations for hedging: 
1. It reduces business risk, thereby increasing returns to 
producers and lowering consumer prices through reduced 
marketing margins. 
2. It allows for the use of a reliable basis, when making 
decisions as to storing or moving wheat. 
3. It facilitates buying and selling decisions simply by 
minimizing the need to consider absolute price levels. 
4. And hedging tends to reduce the unexpected fluctuations in 
cash prices, because of the better predictability realized 
from using futures. 
The significance of the hedge/basis relationship can thus be 
stated quite simply. The commodity futures market provides a measure 
of the value which a large number of traders place upon a commodity, 
to be delivered at a specified time in the future. The hedger can 
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segregate that portion of his total risk, that will result from price 
changes in this "benchmark" measure, and transfer it to others by 
entering a futures contract (long or short). He then retains the 
basis risk, which remains due to the imperfect match between his cash 
and futures positions, and ideally manages this net smaller risk in 
such a way as to realize a profitable outcome. 
Sometimes hedging is appropriate, sometimes inappropriate; 
sometimes it is more costly than the prospective benefit could justify 
and often, it provides a degree of flexibility in marketing that would 
be unattainable otherwise. Hence, most all participants of the grain 
industry should understand the concepts and the potential rewards (or 
losses) of hedging, and indeed, this demands a sound understanding of 
the key to hedging - the basis. This knowledge should benefit these 
participants as they plan their marketing strategies. 
Objectives 
The primary objectives of this study are to: 1) identify the 
major explanatory variables of the Gulf-Kansas City Hard-red Winter 
(HRW) wheat basis, and 2) to estimate each variable's quantitative 
impact on this price spread. To develop a conceptual foundation, the 
underlying principles of basis theory as established through past 
research is examined. The competing market forces, which ultimately 
determine cash and futures prices, that are at work in the HRW wheat 
market are addressed. This will include a look at the supply and 
demand factors as well as government programs and policies which 
affect the market. 
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With this foundation, the second objective is addressed by 
developing an empirical model based on those variables expected to 
contribute to the basis over the crop years 1979 to 1985. The basis 
is calculated across futures contracts reflecting a constant period 
from maturity (CPM) (Malick and Ward, 1985). The basis is defined as 
the Gulf closing price minus the futures contract price that is 
nearest to but greater than a specific time from maturity. To 
identify each variable's empirical contribution to the HRW wheat 
basis, models for one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, and eight 
months from maturity are estimated. Economic and statistical 
interpretations of each explanatory variable are also presented. 
It is to be noted, that the aim of this study is to conceptually 
and empirically explain the basis components, over the above stated 
crop years, and not intended to be a forecasting analysis. Although 
many of the components would be applicable to a forecasting model, the 
continual and unexpected changes in the wheat industry proves this to 
be a very difficult task. The intent here is to reap the benefits of 
understanding the history of the basis, while gaining new knowledge 
into this price relationship as reflected by today's markets. 
CHAPTER II 
CONCEPTUAL FACTORS INFLUENCING BASIS 
The conceptual factors that are expected to explain the Gulf cash 
price minus the Kansas City Hard-red winter (HRW) futures price wheat 
basis are outlined in this chapter. Based on past research and 
theory, it is established that the basis is a function of selected 
variables that relate to storage and transportation costs, to a risk 
premium, and to a convenience yield of holding inventory stocks. It 
will be shown that these concepts depend on the levels of current 
inventories as well as the extent to which these stocks are available 
to be traded. To develop an understanding of the makeup of inventory 
levels, the basic supply and demand factors associated with the HRW 
wheat market and government programs and policies that have affected 
wheat supply and demand will be discussed in Chapter III. 
Cash and Futures Prices 
Cash Price 
The cash market price for wheat depends upon the local supply and 
demand conditions at a given time and place. Factors which contribute 
to its determination include: the price offered the previous day, 
seasonality, changes in government wheat programs, availability of 
storage at the location, competitors' actions, and the activity of 
buyers in the marketing channel. Cash wheat prices are generally low 
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during harvest months, late May through mid-August for the HRW wheat, 
and then rise as the crop year progresses. The degree of impact of 
the economic factors mentioned above will determine the variation 
around the seasonal price level. The Gulf cash price depends on the 
supply and demand conditions there, the storage situation, and the 
handling costs of moving grain from inland terminals. 
Futures Price 
A futures price, as stated by Bailey (1983, p.2), "is truly a 
•consensus• price." A "consensus" on the value of wheat at a specific 
time in the future, of farmers, feed manufacturers, livestock feeders, 
grain merchandisers and others involved in the wheat industry. 
Futures prices reflect what buyers and sellers expect the price to be 
in a given contract month on the basis of currently-available 
information. This understanding is from Working's (1958) "theory of 
anticipatory prices", and is based on the "efficient market" 
hypothesis. An efficient market is defined as one in which there are 
large numbers of equally informed, actively competing people 
attempting to maximize profits (Working 1958). In such a market, at 
any moment in time, price reflects all available information, as well 
as those supply and demand events expected to transpire in the 
foreseeable future. 
Principles of Basis Theory 
Cash/futures price spreads (the basis) are recognized as a 
function of stocks in the case of seasonally-produced commodities that 
need to be stored and are storable in significant quantities. This 
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price, the price of storage, is determined by the supply and demand 
for storage in the same way as any other price (Working, 1934). 
Moreover, like any other market price, it tends to equal the marginal 
cost of production. Production, in this case, refers to provision of 
the storage service. In other words, distant future prices will 
exceed the cash price by the cost of storage and transformation, 
assuming both prices are for similar qualities. 
These conclusions were first developed by Working (1933, 1934) 
out of empirical studies of wheat and stocks, then elaborated in later 
articles by Kaldor (1939), Working (1948, 1949, 1953), Brennan (1958), 
and Weymar (1966). 
Working (1949) showed, contrary to popular belief at the time, 
that the cash price and futures price are not independently determined 
and that expectations regarding upcoming or current economic events 
would tend to affect both prices by approximately the same degree. 
However, depending on the time interval between the prices and the 
timing of the event, one price may be affected slightly more or less 
than the other. Working indicated that this relationship would hold 
even if the two prices occurred in separate crop years or within the 
same crop year, due to the storability of wheat. In answering the 
question, "What are the influences which determine the price 
difference relationship? .. , Working (1949) concluded, as far as 
supplies are concerned, that it was only those supplies "already in 
existence .. that have any significant bearing on this price 
relationship. He notes that this understanding lays the foundation 
for basis theory and that special or complex cases may be subject to 
minor qualifications. 
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Supply of Storage 
When a market is characterized as having adequate supplies, which 
are carried forward to allow for a constant flow, a direct economic 
reward must be payed to those who supply the storage service. This 
reward, or price, is dependent upon the 11 Cost 11 of carrying the stocks 
and will vary according to appropriate competitive supply and demand 
conditions for storage. Accumulation and dispersal of commercial 
inventories are guided by the relationship between cash and futures 
prices. When inventory adjustments are accompanied by the sale and 
purchase of futures contracts, as is typical in the commercial 
movement of wheat, price relationships reflect the inventory position 
very closely. With these understandings, Working (1949) constructed 
what is commonly known as the 11 Supply of storage curve 11 • Figure 1 
represents the general form of the curve, where d equals the marginal 
cost per bushel stored. 
The price of storage (vertical axis) is associated with costs of 
carrying stocks and is positively related to the length of time the 
wheat is stored. As a result it is expected that for a marketing year 
distant futures price will exceed nearer futures and the current cash 
price. For a wide range of inventory levels, the additional cost per 
bushel of storage is believed to be approximately constant. This, in 
particular, is the case for the costs associated with existing 
warehouse or other storage space. As storage space becomes limited, 
the cost (price) of this service will increase sharply. Due to the 
potential for storing competing crops, say corn rather than wheat, the 




















Amount of Wheet Storege Supplied 
Figure 1. Working's Supply of Storage Curve 
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time of the year. Cash/futures price differences, which may be 
positive or negative, provide the incentive or disincentive to store 
between the two points in time. A positive return to storage (basis) 
will lead to an increase in storage use, where basis is defined as 
futures price minus cash price (Working, 1949). 
The limit to the positive price of storage is the cost of storage 
between the two points in time. However according to Tomek and Gray 
(1970, p. 373), "there is no such practicable limit to the negative 
price of storage, yet the principle is the same in that it represents 
the price of using stocks now instead of holding them for later use." 
During times of stock shortages, the cash price may rise above the 
futures price creating a large negative basis. Thus, when the price 
of storage is negative, commonly referred to as an "inverted" basis, 
the amount which is stored tends to be less. Practical limits on the 
size of a negative basis have, however, been introduced into the 
market place, via government price support programs. Cash prices 
above support level prices encourage producers to sell government 
subsidized stocks, thus, increasing available wheat supply and 
ultimately decreasing cash prices. 
Working (1948) points out two possible reasons why stocks would 
be stored when the price of storage is zero or negative. The first 
involves the fact that much of the costs associated with storage 
services are fixed, thereby hindering any movement out of such 
services. This is often referred to as an "asset fixity" problem 
(Edward, 1959). In addition, many firms who offer storage services do 
so as a necessary adjunct to their main operation. Merchandisers and 
processors are examples of such firms~ Negative returns to storage 
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services may well be compensated for by profitable outcomes in a 
firm's merchandising or processing operation. A third reason would be 
to reap a "convenience yield" from the market for holding stocks. 
Convenience Yield 
Kaldor (1939), building on Working's concept by addressing the 
negative return to storage issue, coined the term "convenience yield" 
to express the benefits realized from holding a minimal amount of 
stocks, during times of supply shortage. Actual benefits can accrue 
to those who maintain a working level of stocks because they will 
encounter fewer delays and operate more efficient, lower cost 
production schedules. If the demand for grain is strong relative to 
the available supply, buyers may push the cash market price up 
relative to the futures price. Thus, the convenience yield, from 
maintaining a working inventory, should reduce (offset) a portion of 
the storage and transformation costs or simply stated, results in a 
"narrowing" of the basis. As supplies increase the convenience yield 
declines eventually to zero and the expected future price exceeds the 
cash price by the normal carrying cost (storage and transformation). 
Risk Premium 
Brennan (1958), in support of Working's and Kaldor's contribution 
to the price of storage theory, expands it to include a "risk premium" 
of holding stocks, as he details the makeup of the marginal costs of 
storage and their relationship to observed price spreads. Brennan 
(1958, p. 53) defines the net marginal cost of storage as, " ••• the 
marginal outlay on physical storage plus a marginal risk-aversion 
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factor [risk premium] minus the marginal convenience yield on stocks." 
Here, total costs of physical storage is the sum of rent for storage 
space, handling charges, interest, insurance, and spoilage loss. 
Convenience yield, as discussed earlier, is a decreasing function of 
stocks and offsets a portion of the physical storage cost. 
The "risk premium", however, is shown by Brennan (1958) to be an 
increasing function of stocks and may add to the marginal costs of 
storage. The risk of a commodity value loss given a drop in price is 
small when inventories are low. As stock levels rise, the risk of 
value loss associated with holding stocks also rises and eventually 
could threaten a firm 1 s credit position. Brennan contends, that 
indeed, the risk of value loss constitutes a part of the cost of 
storage and that the market must pay a risk premium to entice firms to 
increase inventories. As the amount of risk goes up, so must the 
expected return. 
Weymar (1966) proposed extending the theory of the supply of 
storage to include "expected inventory behavior over the intervening 
i nterval 11 between cash and futures dates. In other words, if 
expectations of inventory sizes change prior to the end of the crop 
year or to the maturity of a futures contract, then the price of 
storage (basis) is a function of inventory level expectations. 
Weymar 1 s empirical work was in the cocoa market, one characterized by 
a harvest which spreads substantially through time. He explicitly 
notes that the level of current inventory is a good proxy variable for 
expected inventory for seasonally produced commodities harvested over 
a short time period. This is the case for hard-red winter wheat. In 
addition, he too, acknowledges that firms who have available storage, 
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can be induced to carry additional stocks when a risk premium can be 
expected. 
Prior theoretical and empirical work suggests that the basis 
components are the supply and demand for storage, convenience yields, 
and risk premiums. For seasonally produced, storable commodities like 
HRW wheat, all of these components are in some way related to 
inventories. In the following chapter, the basic supply and demand 
factors that determine HRW wheat inventories are reviewed. 
CHAPTER III 
HARD RED WINTER WHEAT SUPPLY AND DEMAND 
Prior research strongly suggests that for storable, seasonally 
produced commodities like HRW wheat, inventory levels are very 
important determinants of the basis components. The purpose of this 
chapter is to discuss the fundamental supply and demand factors that 
ultimately influence the HRW wheat basis. 
Supply 
The annual U.S. wheat supply originates from three sources: 
production, carryin stocks, and imports. 
largest percentage of total supply. 
Production accounts for the 
Carryin stocks (beginning 
inventories) also makeup a significant portion of total supply, 
especially in recent years, as shown in Table 1. Imports have been 
negligible, accounting for much less than one percent of total U.S. 
wheat supply, and are not considered to be a major supply factor. The 
United States accounts for about 13 percent of world production, while 
hard-red winter (HRW) wheat has historically accounted for 50 percent 
of total U.S. production. 
Production 
The total production output of HRW wheat is a function of 
acreages planted and yields. Many market and nonmarket factors affect 
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TABLE I 
U. S. WHEAT SUPPLY AND DISAPPEARANCE! 
ITEM 1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 1982/83 1983/84 1984/85 1985/86 1986/872 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Million Bushels- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
A 11 wheat: 
Beg. Stocks 1177.8 924.1 902.0 989.1 1159.4 1515.1 1398.6 1425.2 1900.1 
Production 1775.5 2134.1 2380.9 2785.4 2765.0 2419.8 2594.8 2424.8 2164.7 
Imports 1.9 2.1 2.5 2.8 7.6 4.0 9.4 14.7 5.2 
Total Supply 2955.2 3060.3 3285.4 3777.3 3932.0 3938.9 4002.8 3864.7 4070.0 
Food 592.4 596.1 610.5 602.4 616.4 642.6 650.9 678.1 690.0 
Seed 87.0 101.0 113.0 110.0 97.0 100.0 93.0 88.0 85.0 
Feed 157.6 86.0 59.0 134.8 194.9 369.1 409.5 283.2 300.0 
Total Domestic Use 837.0 783.1 782.5 847.2 908.3 1111.7 1153.4 1049.3 1075.0 
Exports 1194.1 1375.2 1513.8 1770.7 1508.6 1428.6 1424.2 915.3 1150.0 
Total Demand 2031.1 2158.3 2296.3 2617.9 2416.9 2540.3 2577.6 1964.6 2225.0 
Ending Stocks 3 
Gov•t. Owned 4 51.1 187.8 199.7 190.3 192.0 188.1 377.6 601.7 875.0 
Privately Owned 873.0 714.2 789.4 696.1 1323.1 1210.5 1047.6 1298.3 970.0 
Total Carryover 924.1 902.0 989.1 1159.4 1515.1 1398.6 1425.2 1900.1 1845.0 
...... 
" 
TABLE I (Continued) 
ITEM 1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 1982/83 1983/84 1984/85 1985/86 1986/872 
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Price 














1089 0 0 
1512.0 
347.0 
725 0 0 





440.0 541.0 538.0 
1181.0 1112.0 1243.0 
1621.0 1653.0 1781.0 
379.0 361.0 348.0 
701.0 754.0 679.0 
1080.0 1115 0 0 1027.0 
541.0 538.0 754.0 


















































1/ Imports and exports include flour and products in wheat equivalent. For HRW data are 
approximations, except for production. 
2/ Projected. 
3/ As of May 31st. 
4/ Includes outstanding and reserve loans. 
5/ Includes imports. 
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Wheat Outlook and Situation Report, Washington, D.C., 
Economic Research Service, various issues. 1978-1986. ....... 
():) 
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these two components of production, and they include: weather and 
pests, technological improvements, previous season 1 s wheat prices, and 
government price support and acreage control programs. 
The profitability of competing crop alternatives, which depend on 
relative expected cash price differences, and input costs is an 
important factor for many agricultural crops. However, this is 
generally not the case for hard-red winter wheat. Competing crops are 
those that can be produced with the same resources. If the 
profitability of one crop becomes greater than competing ones, perhaps 
due to changes in product prices or yields, then producers may shift 
production to the more profitable commodity causing a reducing shift 
in the less profitable one. 
Generally speaking, variations in the price of wheat and other 
crops that compete for the same land are not important in determining 
the acreages of wheat planted in the major HRW wheat-producing areas. 
Hard-red winter wheat, many times, is grown on land having 
insufficient moisture for most other cash crops. Returns from other 
systems of farming, such as grass-livestock, frequently are so low as 
not to constitute a practical economic alternative. Investments in 
specialized equipment and patterns of production based on wheat as the 
principal commodity, also serve as deterrents to acreage change. 
Off-farm employment may constitute as an alternative to producing HRW 
wheat, but many times coincides with it. The lack of competing 
alternatives limit the potential for increasing returns from them, and 
hence, this production factor is of little importance to the HRW wheat 
market. 
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Weather and Pests. Short-run changes in output, over one crop 
season, are influenced by the weather and pests. Weather conditions 
can affect seedbed preparation, the growing process, and the 
harvesting of wheat. Insect and disease damage mainly impacts on 
production of wheat during the growing season. The uncertainty which 
surrounds these factors contribute to their potential impact on 
production, as both acreages planted and yields may be affected. As 
an example, in 1981 favorable weather conditions partially contributed 
to an increase in acreages planted of 7 percent over 1980's crop 
(USDA, Wheat Situation, No. 255). The initial forecast estimated 
1981's crop to be 1.2 billion bushels, slightly above the 1980's 
record level of 1.18 billion bushels. However, a late spring freeze 
in the western Wheat Belt held the 1981 HRW wheat crop to 1.11 billion 
bushels, 7 percent below that of 1980 (Table 1). This example 
emphasizes the potentially significant affect that weather conditions 
can have on estimated production and final output. 
In addition to affecting the production level, weather and pests 
damage can have an influence on the quality (protein) of HRW wheat. 
If severe rains or drought hamper the growing process, then protein 
and milling qualities may suffer. And, if these conditions are severe 
enough the production level of normally high quality HRW wheat will be 
reduced. Because of the above reasons, changes in production 
resulting from unusual weather or pest damage is usually treated as a 
temporary and random shift in inventories (Oury, 1965). 
Technological Improvements. Improvements in technology are 
important causes of long-term shifts in production. An improvement in 
technology is defined as something that enables firms to produce more 
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output with the same quantity of input as previously used (Cochrane 
1955). Examples include: higher yielding varieties, better methods 
of insect, weed, and disease control as well as better tillage 
techniques and equipment. All of these serve to potentially increase 
production, but it is often difficult to identify and measure 
precisely how much of a given change in output is due to technical 
improvements and how much is due to changes in weather, product prices 
or input prices. High product prices many times lead to the adoption 
of new production techniques or higher yielding varieties, and this 
11 response relation 11 is the reason for the measurement problem 
(Cochrane, 1955). 
As a further contrast, Heid (1980) argues that the technological 
benefits of commercial fertilizer and new varieties have nearly 
reached their limits. Heid maintains that, 11 increased production 
would have to come from increasing wheat acreages rather than 
increasing yield, unless a new technological breakthrough occurS. 11 
The confusion that surrounds the impact of technology versus price 
changes, lead to the assumption that effects of technology on 
production will be picked up in the time series data which covers the 
data period. 
Government Influences. Government programs obviously have had 
a marked influence on the production and marketing of commodities, 
such as wheat, since the depression years of the 1930 1s (Houck, et 
al., 1976). The programs have supported farm prices and attempted to 
reverse supply trends. The government can hold prices above 
equilibrium levels in the short-run simply by accumulating surpluses 
in storage, but unless additional outlets can be found, this becomes 
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very expensive. In the long-run, it is cheaper for the government to 
limit production, including paying farmers not to produce, rather than 
to purchase commodities and then attempting to dispose of them 
(Meiken, 1955). Two primary supply-adjustment programs used are 
acreage restriction and payment-in-kind programs. 
Acreage restriction programs have been a major feature of 
agricultural support programs in the United States since first 
established by the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933. The 
government has relied mainly on acreage control or land-retirement 
programs in an attempt to curb production, and ultimately reduce 
supply. In effect, the acreage restriction provisions provide a 
mechanism for adjusting ~upply to demand. These programs have been 
voluntary, on the part of producers, and have used direct payments to 
encourage participation. During the 1978 to 1985 crop years, 
deficiency payments were paid based on the positive difference between 
the target price, an administratively set price, and the higher of the 
5-month weighted national average price received by all farmers or the 
national loan rate (USDA, 1985). The purpose of the target price is 
to establish one end of a price range that indicates the magnitude of 
direct payments that would be paid to farmers if prices were below 
levels considered appropriate by the policy makers. The deficiency 
payment amounted to a direct payment during periods of low prices 
without interfering with the market price. 
As further encouragement to participate, the government has 
almost always tied the acreage restriction (set-aside) program to a 
price support program. Growers who comply with the set-aside 
program's provisions are eligible for "nonrecourse" loans and any 
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other disaster payments. Although participation rates have been 
relatively high, attempts to regulate supply via acreage reductions 
have proven very frustrating, and many times fallen short of the 
program•s intended production cutback. Good weather conditions, high 
yields, and farmers laying out their worst producing acres have for 
the most part compensated for planted acreage reductions. As 
previously emphasized, the acreage reduction program•s objective is 
ultimately to stabilize and reduce surplus stocks by cutting 
production and thus, is an indirect influence on cash and futures 
markets wheat prices. The program•s effect on prices is based on its 
impact through production on supplies. 
In the fall of 1982, with surplus stocks mounting to new highs, 
the U.S. government announced a payment-in-kind (PIK) program for 1983 
crops. The plan that evolved was designed to simultaneously make 
sharp cuts in production, reduce government stocks, and avoid 
increasing federal budget outlays. The idea behind the 
payment-in-kind program was to pay farmers not to produce, with 
payments in the form of government held wheat. The PIK program first 
required wheat farmers to divert 20 percent of their producing acres 
to be eligible for the price support program at all. Then, they had 
the option of diverting between 10 to 30 percent more for PIK 
payments. In addition, farmers could bid to remove their whole base 
acreage from production. To encourage participation, especially since 
the January announcement came after the planting season for the HRW 
wheat areas, payments for PIK wheat were set at 95 percent of the 
farmer•s base program yield per acre. The payment was to be 
determined by multiplying the designated PIK acreage by the farm 
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program yield by 95 percent. As an additional inducement, the CCC was 
authorized to pay storage at an annual rate of 26.5 cents a bushel 
from when the PIK grain was receiv~d until disposition, but not for 
more than 5 months (USDA, 1985). 
Although enrollment in the total acreage reduction program was 
surprisingly high, the expected drawdown in stocks did not result. 
The 1983 HRW wheat crop of 1.19 billion bushels was the second largest 
on record, and adding the large carryover from 1982 increased HRW 
wheat supplies to 1.9 billion bushels - a record level at that time 
(Table 1). Ideal growing conditions, coupled with the previously 
mentioned factors that have consistently plagued acreage restriction 
programs, offset a significant reduction of nearly 7 million acres 
(USDA, Wheat Situation, No. 266). This sizable stock volume was a 
significant negative pricing factor, as PIK entitlements, and delayed 
entry into the farmer-owned reserve, increased readily marketable 
supplies. Thus, it can be observed that acreage reduction programs, 
including PIK, may indirectly influence both cash and futures market 
prices, via their anticipated and realized impact on production and 
total supplies. 
Carr yin 
Carryin stocks include those stocks that are not utilized during 
the previous marketing seasons. They represent the net result of past 
imbalances of the supply and demand for wheat. Because of their 
dependency on the total supply/demand picture, individual factors 
which contribute to carryin inventories include those which influence 
production, domestic usage, and exports. As these areas of supply and 
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demand are discussed, a clearer understanding of the makeup of carryin 
inventories will be developed. 
Demand 
Demand for wheat comes from two broad sources: domestic usage 
and exports. Export demand for wheat historically has accounted for 
about 60 percent of the total U.S. demand (Heid, 1980). Hard-red 
winter wheat is the major class of wheat exported, accounting annually 
for approximately 50 percent of total export demand (Makus, 1985). 
Domestic usage of wheat breaks down into food, feed, seed and 
industrial use. In analyzing domestic consumption, industrial usage 
is usually grouped with the food classification and not considered to 
be a major demand factor individually. The wheat industry faces a 
relatively stable domestic demand and a growing, but highly unstable, 
export market (Anderson, 1985). Due to fluctuating export demand, 
total U.S. wheat demand has ranged from 2.61 billion bushels to 1.96 
billion bushels within this data period (Table 1). 
Domestic Usage 
Food Consumption. The largest source of domestic wheat demand 
is food consumption, which varies little from year to year because it 
is primarily dependent on per captia consumption and the number of 
consumers. Over one-half billion bushels are used for domestic food 
annually (Table 1). Our food needs account for approximately 
two-thirds of the annual domestic disappearance, with flour being the 
major product derived from wheat. Per capita consumption of wheat 
flour and cereal products has declined slowly but steadily over the 
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past two and one-half decades (Agricultural Statistics, 1985). 
However, increasing population has prevented a drop in total volume of 
wheat consumed for food (Epp and Malone, 1981). Thus, although food 
consumption is the largest source of domestic disappearance, it is not 
necessarily the most influential domestic demand factor, due to its 
relative stability. 
Feed. Demand for feed wheat has varied in recent years, 
reaching a high of 409 million bushels or 15.7 percent of total U.S. 
production in 1985 (Table 1). Although feeding wheat to livestock 
occurs to some extent in all years, it can represent a substantial 
percentage of the demand when wheat prices are low relative to other 
feed grains. The quantity of wheat fed will vary inversely with the 
spread between its price and prices of other feed grains, such as 
corn. In addition, the nutritional value of wheat is important as it 
has a higher nutritional value than any of the major feed grains 
(Gomme, 1972). 
According to Meiken (1955, p. 55), 11 0n a pound-for-pound basis, 
wheat is worth approximately 105 percent of corn in most livestock 
feeding operations ... As the ratio of the price of wheat to the price 
of corn approaches this value, use for feed increases rapidly. 
Conversely, when the price of wheat is substantially above its value 
in relation to corn, wheat fed to livestock declines to a minimum, 
representing mainly wheat unfit for human consumption (Meiken, 1955). 
Feed use was particularly heavy in 1983, 1984, and 1985, and 
constituted a noticeable increase in the quantity of wheat demanded 
(Table 1). Thus, the use of wheat as a feed grain provides for 
potential variations in total domestic demand. 
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Seed. Seed usage historically represents 3 to 7 percent of the 
total demand for U.S. wheat and only randomly varies enough to affect 
total U.S. domestic demand (Heid, 1980). The factors that control 
seed usage are primarily farmer's expectations based on current prices 
and new-crop futures prices, expected beginning inventories, and the 
expectations or announced intentions of the USDA in regard to its 
proposed price support program for the following year. For example, 
in the 1980/81 crop year farm prices were nearly $4 a bushel and 
new-crop futures (Wheat Situation 1980) pointed to even higher prices. 
This outlook coupled with no set-aside requirements because of 
expected record level exports, resulted in winter wheat growers 
seeding nearly 57 million acres - 8 percent more than the previous 
season. In sum, seed usage is a relatively stable domestic demand 
factor, however, it may in selective years cause a moderate variation 
in expected wheat demand. 
Exports 
Exports are a major position of total U.S. demand and thus, are 
very important in determining current inventories. Historically, over 
half of the cash receipts from U.S. wheat have come from exports. 
Exports increased until 1982/83 and decreased thereafter. One 
important factor which governs U.S. export demand is the stock levels 
of U.S. wheat importers and export competitors, relative to those in 
the U.S. Many of the factors which affect world stocks are the same 
as those that affect domestic stocks, such as weather, yields, 
acreages planted, and carryin stocks. In years when foreign crop 
prospects are low, other things constant, the United States' 
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commercial exports will be high. In reality, other factors are not 
constant and consequently, these factors can influence export demand. 
An "other" factor of particular importance, is the implication of 
government programs and policies, both here and abroad, as interpreted 
by world market participants. 
According to Paarlberg (1985, p. 5), U.S. agricultural and macro 
economic policies are "inseparably linked to our trade policies and 
export volumes ... The choice of a domestic policy set by the United 
States largely determines an implicit trade policy, which may conflict 
with the objectives of commodity programs. Other exporting countries 
can interpret the effect of U.S. policies on world prices and react in 
a way that is to their advantage. An indepth look at the implications 
of U.S. policies on export demand is beyond the necessary scope of 
this study. However, a brief overview of the important farm policies 
(loan rates, target prices, acreage restrictions) and macroeconomic 
policies as they relate to export demand should be instructive. The 
following examination will draw largely from Paarlberg's (1985) work 
on government policies and their relationship to agricultural exports. 
To illustrate and clarify these issues, a simply graphically model 
will be used which represents the workings of international trade. 
For simplicity, Paarlberg (1985) assumed that the world consists of 
two countries, the United States and the rest-of-the-world (ROW). 
Other assumptions are that all other prices, income, population, 
technology, and consumer tastes are constant, and that transportation 
and handling charges are nonexistent. 
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Export Subsidies. An export subsidy is any government 
intervention that lowers the net costs to the foreign buyer and may 
include direct cash subsidies, transportation subsidies, and 
subsidized credit. Interest in targeted subsidized credit (to 
specific countries) was renewed in the early eighties as farm prices 
fell and wheat stocks accumulated. Programs of these type have 
included the Public Law 480 program, the GSM-5 Direct Credit program, 
and the credit guarantee program (GSM-102). For example, in 1982 the 
P.L. 480 and GSM-102 program were used to ship a total of 7.2 million 
tons of wheat. 
According to Paarlberg (1985, p. 13), 11 a targeted subsidy can 
have one of three effects on U.S. exports, depending on how the 
importer reacts. 11 First the target importer may simply use the 
subsidized imports to offset the normal commercial purchases from the 
United States, resulting in no expansion of U.S. exports. Second, the 
importer may use the subsidy to offset imports from competing 
exporters. Whether or not this results in expanded U.S. exports 
depends on the actions of the displaced exporters. If they sell wheat 
to other U.S. customers, there may be no net gain in U.S. exports 
rather simply a rerouting of world trade. Thirdly, the subsidized 
importer could increase U.S. purchases causing an increase in U.S. 
exports. In reality, all three responses are likely to occur to some 
extent, thus the net effect may be difficult to evaluate. 
loan Rates. The U.S. government acts as the buyer of last 
resort under the nonrecourse loan program by purchasing commodities 
for stocks at the loan rate. Thus, U.S. prices are prevented from 
dropping much below the loan rate. The nonrecourse loan program has 
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supported U.S. and world wheat prices in most years since 1950 (Heid, 
1980). Although market prices were above the loan rate for most of 
the seventies, the rise in the loan rate and the leveling off of farm 
prices caused the loan rate to act as a floor for U.S. commodity 
prices. Figure 2 represents this relationship. The nonrecourse loan 
distorts the U.S. demand curve by making it perfectly elastic (flat) 
at the loan rate. The distorted demand curve then becomes Dao•. As a 
result, the excess supply curve (ES) is also perfectly elastic at the 
loan rate. The market equilibrium price and the quantity of U.S. 
exports are determined where the excess supply curve of the U.S. 
intersects the excess demand curve of the ROW. When the loan rate is 
the market price, this intersection occurs in the perfectly elastic 
portion of the U.S. excess supply curve. The level of U.S. exports is 
given by Xw. 
If there were no U.S. loan rate policy, the equilibrium world 
price and U.S. export quantity would be determined by the intersection 
of the undistorted U.S. excess supply curve (ES) with the excess 
demand curve (ED). The resulting equilibrium world price is given by 
PF and the quantity of U.S. exports by XF. The world market 
equilibrium price is lower and the quantity of U.S. exports is greater 
than the solution with the loan rate policy. Thus, from the 
perspective of foreign nations, the U.S. loan rate appears as an 
implicit export tax which raises the world price and lowers U.S. 
exports. U.S. wheat prices were at the loan rate during the 1982/83 
crop year, whereby functioning as an export tax by raising world 
prices. Paarlberg (1985) estimated that had there been no loan rate, 
U.S. wheat exports would have been about 3 million tons greater. 
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Direct export subsidies and concessional sales however, offset a 
·portion of the potential export loss. 
Target Prices. The target price and deficiency payment program 
distorts the U.S. domestic supply curve, making it perfectly inelastic 
(vertical) for prices between the target price and the loan rate. 
Figure 3 shows their price relationship as if it occurred in the late 
seventies. The market clearing price would be PF and the quantity 
of U.S. exports XF without the price support offered by the target 
price and deficiency payment. When the target price policy is in 
effect, the distorted U.S. excess supply equals excess demand at a 
world price (PW) and a U.S. trade quantity of Xw. Figure 3 shows 
that under the program, PW is less than the price that would have 
prevailed without the distortions, PF. Because the world market 
price is lowered by U.S. policy, exports (XW) are corresponding 
greater than the free-trade level(XF). The U.S. target price and 
associated deficiency payments appear to the ROW as an export subsidy 
which lowers the world price and promotes U.S. exports. The fall in 
the world market price can be explained by recognizing that in absence 
of acreage restrictions programs, payments to farmers encourage 
additional production. Consumer prices must fall to absorb this 
additional production, thereby, expanding use. During 1978/79, the 
season•s average farm price of wheat in the U.S. was between the 
target price and loan rate. Paarlberg (1985) estimated that without 
this program U.S. wheat exports would have been 3 million tons less 
for 1978/79. 
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Acreage Restriction. The analysis of the effects of the target 
price and the loan rate assumed that the U.S. government did not have 
acreage restriction programs. Compliance with U.S. set-aside or paid 
diversion programs, however, is necessary in most years for producers 
to receive price support benefits. According to Paarlberg, (1985, p. 
24) 11 tying program benefits to participation can offset the export 
subsidy aspects of the target price policy, but does not change the 
export tax effects of the loan rate 11 • The consequences of an acreage 
restriction program when the target price policy is in effect are 
shown in figure 4. Acreage restriction programs shift the U.S. 
domestic supply and the U.S. excess supply curves left, depending on 
the amount of land taken out of production and the yield of that land. 
The initial equilibrium price, which would have prevailed without the 
target price policy, is assumed to be PF. The quantity of U.S. 
exports with the target price policy is Xw, and XF without the 
policy. The portion of the excess supply curve above the loan rate 
shifts to the left in a parallel fashion. 
As a result of the acreage restriction program, the resulting 
world equilibrium price exceeds the original target policy trade 
price, and is assumed to be back at free-trade levels (PF). The 
program raises the world price and reduces U.S. exports from XW to 
XF, where XF is assumed to be the free-trade level. From the 
perspective of the ROW the imposition of the acreage restriction 
program offsets the export subsidy resulting from the target price 
policy. If the actual supply shift is greater than that shown, than 
the implicit export subsidy would become an implicit export tax. If 
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When prices are at the 1 oan rate, as in figure 2, the shift in 
the U.S. excess supply curve does not change the world market price, 
which remains at the loan rate. Because the world market price is 
unaffected, exports are unchanged, and the loan rate continues to act 
as an export tax. 
Decisions about target prices, the loan rate, and acreage 
restriction programs project a U.S. trade policy to other nations. 
The wider the range between the target price and the loan rate, the 
more likely the U.S. is to impose an export subsidy, from the 
perspective of the ROW. The higher the loan rate, the more frequently 
the U.S. implicitly taxes exports. 
Macroeconomic Policies. Although macroeconomic factors lie 
outside the agricultural sector, they can play an important role in 
determining the competitive position of U.S. wheat in the world 
market. The adoption of floating exchange rates in 1973, the oil 
price shocks of 1978-81, and the increased economic efficiency of 
markets, particularly financial, have considerably increased the 
intergradation of the world economy in which wheat competes 
(Paarlberg, 1985). Paarlberg (1985, p. 56) goes on to state that, 
"U.S. macroeconomic policies affect agricultural exports because of 
the size of the U.S. economy relative to the world economy, and 
because of the high degree of integration in international financial 
markets." 
Because of this economic efficiency and interdependency of 
international capital markets, it is generally assumed that 
international capital flows freely between markets. As a result, 
changes in interest rates will cause rapid shifts in the flow of funds 
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among countries. 
U.S. interest rates can be affected by both U.S. monetary and 
fiscal policies. Monetary policies which tighten the money supply 
increase U.S. interest rates. Expansionary U.S. fiscal policies raise 
U.S. interest rates due to an increased demand for money. High U.S. 
interest rates, coupled with the stability of our government and the 
potential for capital gains from holding U.S. dollars while their 
value is rising, increases the total demand for U.S. dollars 
(Henneberry, Henneberry and Glecker, 1986). The resulting capital 
inflow can lead to an appreciation of the U.S. dollar, as was seen in 
the early 1980's. The measure of the value of the U.S. dollar 
relative to other foreign currencies is through the exchange rate. 
U.S. macroeconomic policies which lead to an increase in the 
interest rate relative to other countries results in an appreciation 
of the U.S. dollar, consequently a higher exchange rate. This says 
that it takes more foreign currency to purchase U.S. dollars, which 
may be used to purchase U.S. exports, such as wheat. According to 
Henneberry and Sanders (1986, p. 2), "Many economists have concluded 
from analysis of such events that a strong 'inverse' relationship does 
indeed exist between U.S. exchange rates and exports: when the dollar 
gets stronger, or more valuable in terms of the exchange rates with 
another country, exports to that country decline; alternatively, 
exports increase when the dollar weakens." In addition, an increase 
in capital inflow into the U.S. means that less capital is available 
in the foreign countries for which to purchase U.S. exports. 
Besides exchange rates, other factors contribute to the level of 
export demand from those countries which import U.S. wheat. Although 
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t h e d o 1 1 a r f e 1 1 i n v a 1 u e on t h e i n t e r n at i on a 1 mark e t i n ear 1 y 1986 , 
the anticipated increase in exports did not result. Henneberry and 
Sanders(1986) reason that an explanation for this may partially rest 
with the way in which the depreciation of the dollar is measured. 
They conclude that even though the dollar has fallen with respect to 
the currency of other countries, such as the German mark, it has not 
fallen relative to those currencies of the major wheat importing 
countries. Hence, the value of the U.S. dollar relative to the major 
U.S. wheat importers is important when analyzing expected export 
demand and the resulting inventory levels. 
Government Held Versus 11 Free 11 Supplies 
The makeup of inventories and the significance of their 
relationship to the Gulf-Kansas City HRW wheat basis has been 
established. However, in looking at this relationship, it is also 
important to analyze the amount of stocks available to the market 
( 11 free 11 supplies) versus the amount held off the market via government 
programs, particularly the nonrecourse loan and the farmer-owned 
reserve. The degree of use of the loan and, conversely, the amount of 
wheat available in private trade channels is a price determining 
v a r i a b l e t h r o u g h o u t t h e c r o p y e a r . As Gray ( 196 2 ) s t at e s , 11 Th e l o an 
is said to be •working• as more wheat moves into loan, tightening up 
free market supplies and forcing prices up to or beyond loan levels .... 
If free stocks are tight for example, Gulf cash prices will increase 
relative to the futures prices in an attempt to draw existing stocks 
to the Gulf. Under these conditions, the basis would increase to 
reflect the incentive to bring wheat out of storage and place it on 
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the market. 
The amount of wheat placed under loan and the amount taken over 
by the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) depends largely on the 
relationship between market cash prices and support prices (Ehrich 
1966). Certain nonprice factors also affect the degree of loan use, 
and they include: lack of approved storage space, ineligibility in 
the loan program due mainly to noncompliance with acreage 
restrictions, lack of full information and understanding of the 
program, and political hostility on the part of producers. In 
addition, eligible producers may prefer to speculate on free market 
price being pushed high enough by the loan entries of other producers 
to provide a better outlet than the loan itself provides. These 
farmers may delay their choice until near the program's signup 
deadline, thus prolonging the uncertainty that surrounds the influence 
of loans on supplies. 
Movement into loan constitutes at least a temporary reduction in 
free supplies, although redemption of the wheat put up as collateral 
is permitted, and there are, of course, other means by which wheat 
placed under loan can re-enter the free market. One such means is 
when the national average farm price surpasses the farm-owned reserve 
(FOR) release price, thus allowing for the release of FOR wheat. Gray 
(1967) goes on to say, "the mechanism by which the loan support price 
is through such supply removal as actual loan entries entail, plus 
what ever influence the threat of such supply removal exerts upon 
prospective buyers - in other words, price and inventory availability 
is influenced by loan entries, actual and anticipated." Due to this 
well-recognized influence, a measurement of the degree of loan use 
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should be included in a meaningful price analysis. The spread between 
cash prices and government support prices in an indirect measure of 
the degree of loan use (Ehrich 1966). If cash prices are high 
relative to support prices, producers place less wheat under loan, so 
a larger amount will move into private trade channels. Greater loan 
use will occur when cash prices are low relative to support prices. 
Summary of Inventories Relationship 
to the Basis 
The weekly price of ·storage (the basis) is determined by the 
supply of and the demand for the storage service. Because the 
supply-of-storage is relatively stable, the basis is dependent upon 
the demand for storage, which is a function of the level of 
inventories and the cost of carrying these stocks over time. 
Inventory levels are a reflection of the past, current, and 
anticipated wheat supply/demand picture. In addition, government 
programs via their implicit and explicit impacts on production, 
carryin stocks, and export demand can play a dominating role in 
inventory level determination. Past empirical research supports the 
hypothesis that basis is a function of inventory levels. In a 
1980 study, Martin, Groenewegen and Pidgeon empirically investigate 
the factors which affect the corn basis in Southwestern Ontario, 
Canada. These researchers conclude that this basis is cheifly a 
function of variables which represent the local inventory situation. 
With an understanding of both basis theory and the makeup of HRW 
wheat inventories, a conceptual model to explain the Gulf-Kansas City 
HRW wheat basis can be hypothesized. It is hypothesized that the 
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basis is a function of actual exports, export expectations, government 
loan program usage, free stocks, inland storage problems, and 
transportation problems. An empirical model, using variables which 
represent these conceptual expectations is developed in Chapter IV. 
CHAPTER IV 
EMPIRICAL MODEL AND DATA 
As stated in Chapter I, basis for this study is defined as the 
Gulf cash bid less the futures contract price that is nearest to being 
a specific time from maturity. This definition is an adoption of 
Malick and Ward's (1987) constant period from maturity (CPM) model. A 
CPM basis model was developed for this analysis mainly to alleviate 
statistical problems associated with discontinous data sets. Data 
gaps between contract years can lead to missing observations when 
looking at the basis of each HRW wheat contract individually over 
time. 
The basis was calculated as cash minus futures so that the 
results would be readily applicable to most participants in the wheat 
industry. Many of these participants are 11 basis traders 11 , i.e. they 
conduct trades on the number of cents over or under a selected futures 
contract price. The basis could have been defined as futures minus 
cash, as Working (1948) and others did, with the direction of 
influence of the variables reversed. 
Thursday Price 
Thursday's cash and futures prices were used in calculation of 
the weekly basis for the model. The use of one day of the week as a 
representative of the entire week should restrict the analysis to a 
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mid-week price. On Friday, there may be liquidation of contracts by 
traders who do not wish to hold their position over the weekend. This 
is in contrast to Monday where speculation reaction to weekend news 
may be greatest. Having removed both Monday's and Friday's price from 
consideration there was little difference among the other three days 
of the week. Thursday's price was selected because of the 
availability of data on related variables. For instance, export data, 
which is diseminated by the Foreign Agriculture Service through~ 
Export Sales, is released as of Thursday for the week. Weekly price 
adjustments, which occur as a result of changing information, should 
consistently be as unbiased on Thursday, as on Tuesday or Wednesday. 
Indicator variables (qualitative) which are employed in the model will 
be entered such that their impact is reflected on the Thursday 
following their release. 
The Data Period 
The analysis will cover January, 1979 through the 1985-86 crop 
marketing year. This time span should sufficiently represent the 
pricing factors that have dominated recent HRW wheat seasons. The 
starting crop year was determined largely by the need for a breakdown 
of total wheat stocks. The USDA began separating free stocks from 
government-held stocks in late 1978 (USDA 1978). The data period was 
ended in 1985-86 to avoid the impacts of recently enacted agricultural 
government programs upon the basis determination. Although these 
programs may impact on inventories, and thus the basis, their full 
effect is certainly not observable in the marketplace as of yet. The 
data period covers several years in which there were large government 
44 
surpluses, due to noticeable increases and decreases in production and 
exports, respectively. Encompassing almost eight full crop years, the 
weekly data set provides 387 useable weekly observations. 
Constant Period From Maturity Basis 
The HRW wheat basis, using the 1-month constant period from 
maturity for illustrative purposes, is defined as 
B1t = GPt - FPMayt; if weeks to maturity for the March 
HRW wheat contract are less than 5 weeks (1 month), 
B1t = GPt - FPJulyt; if weeks to maturity for the 
May contract are less than 5 weeks, 
B1t = GPt - FPSept.t; if weeks to maturity for the 
July contract are less than 5 weeks, 
81t = GPt - FPDec.t; if weeks to maturity for the 
September contract are less than 5 weeks, 
B1t = GPt - FPMar.t; if weeks to maturity for the 
December contract are less than 5 weeks., 
where: 
B1t = Basis in period t for the 1-month from maturity 
model (dollars per bushel), 
GPt = HRW wheat Gulf cash bid, delivered to the Gulf 
(dollars per bushel), and 
FP(contract month)t = Kansas City's HRW futures 
contract settlement price for each respective 
contract month (dollars per bushel). 
( 1 ) 
At this stage, the basis reflects the cost of storage and 
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transportation of HRW wheat plus any interest on the initial 
investment. Storage cost can be defined as 
TSC1t = (WKMAT1/52)*SC1+ [(WKMAT1/52)*PIR/100* Gulfclose] (2) 
where: 
TSC1t = total storage and interest cost in period t 
for the 1-month from maturity model (dollars 
per bushel), 
WKMAT1t = seek to maturity for 1-month CPM basis model 
(not less than 5 weeks), 
SC1t = annual weighted average storage rate to 
warehouses for storage of CCC wheat (USDA, 
Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation 
Service). 
PIRt = prime interest rate (Federal Reserve 
Bulletin, various issues), and 
Gulfclose = HRW wheat cash bid, delivered to the Gulf 
(dollars per bushel). 
By eliminating the known component of total storage cost (TSC1t) 
from the basis (81), the remaining unknown components yield a basis 
residual [(Brennan (1958), Ward and Daase (1977), Malick and Ward 
(1985)]. Since basis is defined as the cash price minus the futures 
price, total storage costs must be added. Thus, the basis residual 
(BR1), is defined as 
BR1t = B1t + TSC1t 
where: 
BR1t = basis residual in period t for 1-month from 
maturity model (dollars per bushel), 
( 3 ) 
------
B1t = basis in period t for 1-month from maturity 
model (dollars per bushel), and 
TSC1t = total storage cost (actual physical cost plus 
interest on investment) in period t for 1-month 
from maturity model (dollars per bushel). 
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This remaining basis residual represents the convenience yield and 
risk premium of holding inventory stocks, transportation costs as well 
as variables specifically related the HRW wheat industry. 
Previous basis models have substracted out transportation costs 
between delivery points. The difficulty in obtaining an accurate 
single estimate of transportation rates over the data period, due 
largely to the passage of the Staggers Rail Act of 1980, preclude 
netting out transportation costs. The Staggers Act deregulated the 
rail industry and allowed for private contracting of transportation 
rates, which are unpublished. Because of the importance of 
transportation cost to the basis, a indicator variable is used in the 
model to account for unseasonal pressure upon the basis due to 
short-term problems in the transportation of wheat to the Gulf. 
Examples would include railroad workers strikes, railway problems, or 
barge transportation problems. 
The remaining basis residual is the focus of our empirical 
analysis. The empirical model hypothesized to represent the 
conceptual model from Chapter III is shown below. 
HRW Wheat Basis Residual Model 
The CPM basis residual model is specified where (m) represents 
the months to maturity period, which will range from one month (the 
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nearby) to eight months. The (m) will initially be dropped for 
clarity reasons until final specification of the model is presented. 
Definition of the variables included will be explained ~ubsequently. 
A partial adjustment model will be used in this analysis to 
account for the time required for new information to be assimulated by 
the market. "Traders may not react to every market signal simply 
because longer term hedging positions are adjusted in a consistent 
manner with forward pricing needs and not to interim market price 
changes", (Malick and Ward, 1985, pg. 5). Hence, it is hypothesized 
that the observed value of BRt adjusts to its equilibrium value 
according to 
BRt - BRt_1 = <P (BR* t -BRt_1) 
where: 
BRt = the observed basis residual in period t, 
BR*t =the fully adjusted basis residual equilibrium 
value as explained by the static conditions of 
the hypothesized variables in equation (5) 
below, and 
<P = the adjustment coefficient. 
( 4) 
The "adjustment coefficient" measures the proportion by which the 
difference between BR*t and BRt_ 1 is reduced during period t. 
When <P= 1, the observed basis residual is equal to the fully adjusted 
basis residual (BRt = BR*t), the adjustment is total and 
immediate, and we are back in the static case. The model implies that 
O< <P <1. The smaller <Pis, the smaller is the immediate adjustment 
and the adjustment period is longer. 
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The fully adjusted basis residual (BR*t) model is defined by 
BR*t = Bo + B1MLt + B2CMYSALESt + B3DIFFt + ( 5) 
B4ACAVGEXt + B5USESTEXt + B6GEt + B7TSt + 
B8ISt + B9DUM3t + B10DUM7t + B11DUM9t + 
B12DUM12t 
where: 
BR*t = The fully adjusted basis residual given the 
static conditions of period t (dollars per 
bushel). 
Mlt =The ratio of trading volume to open 
interest for the HRW wheat contracts. 
CMYSALESt = The ratio of current-marketing year•s 
outstanding export sales OESt to estimated 
free stocks (FSt). Outstanding sales equal 
beginning sales plus new sales minus purchases 
from foreign sellers minus buy back and 
cancellations minus exports. Free stocks were 
estimated by substracting estimated domestic 
usage, estimated government stocks, and 
accumulated weekly exports for the current 
marketing year, from estimated total 
availability (million bushel units). 
DIFFt =The Gulf cash bid minus the national loan rate 
for wheat. This variable represents an 
indirect measure of the degree of loan use 
(dollar per bushel). 
ACAVGEXt =The CMY•s weekly average exports given the 
number of weeks into the crop year (million 
bushel units). 
USESTEXt =The USDA•s estimated average weekly exports 
for the CMY (million bushel units). 
Estimates are first projected in July of the 
CMY and updated monthly. 
GEt = The 1980-81 government grain embargo to the 
Soviet Union. Entered into the model as 1 
when the embargo was in effect, otherwise 0. 
TSt = Transportation indicator variable. When 
there is problems in transporting wheat to 
the Gulf this variable is entered as 1, 
otherwise 0. 
ISt = Inland storage indicator variable. When 
inland storage is reported to be tight, this 
variable is 1, otherwise 0. 
DUM3,7,9,12t =Indicator variables which are entered into 
the model as intercept shifters to account 
for contract month influences on the basis. 
DUM3, DUM?, DUM9, and DUM12 are defined as 1 
when the March, July, September, and 
December contract months, respectively, are 
used to calculate the basis in period t. 
They are zero otherwise. 
Substituting equation (5) into equation (4) yields, 
BRt-BRt_1 = ~(B 0+B 1MLt+B 2 CMYSALESt···- BRt_ 1) 
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( 6 ) 
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Rearranging equation (6) yields the estimatable, partial adjustment 
model for the "m 11 -month from maturity basis residual, such that 
BR(m)t = B0+(1-¢)BRt-l+¢B1MLt+¢B2CMYSALESt+ 
where: 
¢ B3DIFF + ¢B4ACAVGEX + ¢ B5USESTEX + ¢ B6GEt + 
cp B7 TSt + ¢B8ISt + cp B9DUM3 +¢ a10oUM7 + 
cp s11 DUM9 + cp s12oUM12 
BR(m)t = The (m)-month from maturity basis residual 
in period t (dollars per bushel), 
m = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8. 
(7) 
The independent variables in equation (7) are as explained in 
equations 4, 5, and 6. The remainder of Chapter IV will discuss the 
expected sign of the effect of each variable on the basis residual. 
Hypothesized Relationships 
The explanatory variables used to construct the CPM basis 
residual model were based on past research and theory. In addition, 
an extensive overview of the HRW wheat industry was conducted in an 
attempt to identify those unique variables which have led to basis 
variation over the data period. The presence of correlation among the 
independent variables was also a selection criteria. Independent 
variables which are highly related to each other can lead to biased 
coefficient estimates. Although the correlation testing procedures 
(Pearson) showed ACAVGEX and USESTEX to be highly correlated, there 
was no other evidence of potential multicollearnity problems. Both 
variables were left in the model to measure the uniqueness of actual 
exports versus USDA estimated exports. Table II presents each 
TABLE II 




ML Wall Street Journals, Thursday•s issues 
CMYSALES Outstanding Export Sales: USDA, FAS, U.S. Export Sales 
Free stocks: USDA, FAS, World Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates 
DIFF Gulf Cash Bid: Wall Street Journal, Thursday•s issues 
Loan Rates: USDA, ASCS Commodity Fact Sheet, May 1986 
ACAVGEX USDA, FAS, U.S. Export Sales 
USESTEX USDA, FAS, World Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates 
GE USDA, Grain Market News Weekly Summary 
TS USDA, Grain Market News Weekly Summary 





USDA = United States Department of Agriculture; FAS = Foreign Agriculture Service. 
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variable's source, as well as the mean and variance of the 
quantitative variables. 
Market Liquidity (ML) 
The total size of the volume and open interest indicates the 
degree of current liquidity in a specific futures market (Tewels, 
Harlow, and Stone, 1977). Considerable research has been done to 
identify whether speculation does or does not cause excessive price 
movement. No final conclusions have yet been drawn on this subject, 
but the weight of evidence indicates that speculation probably does 
more to smooth price fluctuation than to increase it (Larson, 1961). 
Thus, any lack of speculation in the futures market may have potential 
price-distorting effects. 
Trade volume should be high enough such that any participant 
wishing to liquidate a contract can do so without bearing added entry 
and exit costs. If the volume of trade can adequately cover total 
commitments then market liquidity is not a problem. If, on the other 
hand, lack of speculation adds to futures price fluctuation then 
liquidity problems may arise. The conflicting research into the 
liquidity issue, coupled with the uncertainty of how futures prices 
will respond, leads to an indeterminable hypothesized sign, a priori. 
Ratio of Current Marketing Year's Export Sales 
to Estimated Freestocks(CMYSALES) 
This variable represents the ratio of CMY's weekly outstanding 
export sales to estimated free stocks. Each variable's relationship 
to the basis must be analyzed to determine the ratio's overall 
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hypothesized sign. The numerator represents the export demand for 
wheat during the current-marketing year (CMY). Increasing sales 
signify greater CMY demand, thus the Gulf cash bid should react by 
rising relative to the futures price and increasing the basis 
residual. 
Free stocks, as defined here, represent the expected 
market-available supply of wheat for CMY. As free stocks increase, 
the additional stocks are expected to push Gulf cash prices down 
relative to the futures price. 
To summarize, it is hypothesized that the basis residual is 
positively related to exports and negatively related to free stocks. 
By putting the variables in the ratio, the partial derivatives are 
* 
) aBRt ( 0\ ( 8 ) cFSt = -82 FS2 t 
and * aBRt 
= B2jFS t ( 9) 
aost 
Therefore, s2 is expected to be positive so that equation (8) is 
negative and equation (9) is positive. It is also clear from (8) and 
(9) that the effect of FSt on BRt depends on OSt and the effect 
of OSt on BRt depends on FSt. 
Difference Between the Gulf Cash 
Price and the Loan Rate(DIFF) 
DIFF represents the difference between the Gulf cash bid and the 
national loan rate for wheat. This indirect measure of the degree of 
loan use is hypothesized to be negatively related to the basis. If 
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cash prices are low relative to this support price, producers are 
anticipated to place more wheat under loan, so less is available in 
private trade channels. Smaller loan use will occur when cash prices 
are high relative to support prices. Thus, when anticipated loan use 
is down more wheat is expected to be available to the market, causing 
the Gulf cash price to fall relative to the futures. The result is a 
decrease in the basis. 
Actual Average Weekly Exports(ACAVGEX) 
Actual exports relative to the number of weeks into the current 
marketing year is reflective of the actual demand for wheat at the 
Gulf ports. As actual exports increase, the need to draw wheat out of 
storage should cause the Gulf cash price to increase relative to the 
K.C. futures price. Hence, the hypothesized sign of ACAVGEX to the 
basis residual is positive. 
USDA Estimated HRW Wheat Weekly 
Exports(USESTEX) 
USDA estimated exports are hypothesized to be negatively related 
to the basis. When total estimated exports for the crop year are 
reported to be high, traders who anticipate higher cash prices in the 
future will push the futures price up relative to the current cash 
price. As a result, the basis will decrease. 
Grain Embargo(GE) 
The government grain embargo's relationship to the basis residual 
is hypothesized to be negative. The embargo cut off shipments from 
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the U.S. to the Soviet Union. The reduced demand at the Gulf led to 
lower Gulf cash prices relative to the futures prices. The purchasing 
of the wheat committed to the Soviet Union by the U. S. government 
aided in stabilizing the futures prices. Thus, the embargo•s effect 
on market prices is expected to inversely impact on the basis. 
Transportation Situation(TS) 
The transportation indicator variable enters the model for 
periods when problems in transporting wheat from inland points to 
either the Gulf or a par delivery point are reported in the Grain 
Market News weekly summary of market conditions •. 
When transportation of wheat to the Gulf is reported to be 
slowed, then the associated costs are expected to rise. To compensate 
the seller of wheat for this added cost, perhaps due to alternative 
transportation modes, the Gulf cash price is expected to show a 
short-term increase. Thus, relative to the futures price, a widening 
or positive impact on the basis is hypothesized. 
Inland Storage(IS) 
The inland storage indicator variable is included to reflect 
periods when inland storage facilities for Hard-red Winter wheat are 
in short supply, as reported in the Grain Market News weekly summary 
of market conditions. 
This variable should be inversely related to the basis. When 
inland storage for HRW wheat is reported to be tightening, the 
unstored wheat provides incentive for the Gulf cash bid to drop. The 
futures price, realizing that the unstored wheat will clear the 
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market, reflects a stable future cash price. This price squeeze then 
results in a narrowing of the basis. This relationship describes in 
general the post-harvest reaction and, should be more observable in 
the shorter maturity periods. 
Contract Month Indicator 
Variables(DUM3,7,9,12) 
The indicator variables, DUM3, DUM?, DUM9, and DUM12, indicate 
the contract month used in calculation of the basis. They represent 
the March, July, September, and December contract months, 
respectively. May is omitted and is in the intercept. No algebraic 
sign is hypothesized, a priori. 
CHAPTER V 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION 
Estimation Procedures 
Least squares estimation procedures are used in the analysis. 
All of the ordinary least squares (OLS) assumptions are not likely to 
hold for the basis residual model (equation 7). As with any weekly 
time series, the error terms of the model are potential serially 
correlated, i.e. possible autocorrelation problems exist. When 
autocorrelation is present the OLS parameter estimates are not 
efficient and the standard error estimates are biased. In assuming 
autocorrelation problems exists, the basis residual model is estimated 
using a maximum likelihood (ML) procedure. The ML estimates employ a 
Guass-Marquardt algorithm to maximize the log likelihood, using the 
OLS estimates as starting values (Judge, et al., 1985). This 
procedure corrected for up to a specified third-order autocorrelation 
where the significance level of the autoregressive parameters was set 
at .1, and nonsignificant autoregressive parameters were eliminated. 
Evaluation of Independent Variable 
Parameter estimates and their associated t-values for the eight 
models are presented in Table III. Independent variables included in 
the model are listed down the left side of the table and the months to 
maturity periods across the top. Various statistics are presented in 
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TABLE II I 
ESTIMATES FOR THE CPM HARD-RED WINTER WHEAT BASIS RESIDUAL MODEL /1 
Independent Months to Maturitl 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Intercept 0.2029 0.1893 0.1485 0.1328 .1635 .10969 0.1689 0.0788 
( 4.490) ( 4.991) ( 3.893) ( 3.237) ( 3.337) ( 2.193) ( 3.348) ( 1.568) 
BRt-1 0.6429 .7820 0.8215 0.8431 0.8334 0.8603 .8684 0.8362 
(13.962) (25.443) (28.882) (29.874) (29.564) (30.679) (31.357) (29.562) 
ML 0.1496 -0.1226 0.0656 0.0232 0.0069 -0.0307 0.0411 -0.018 
( 2.230) (-1.768) ( .952) ( 0.333) ( 0.093) (-0.425) ( 0.551) (-0.238) 
CMYSALES 0.2515 0.1524 0.1456 0.1094 0.1208 0.1778 0.1516 0.1376 
( 2.764) ( 2.005) ( 1. 982) ( 1.412) ( 1.506) ( 2.210) ( 1.901) ( 1.653) 
DIFF 0.0023 -0.0021 -0.0044 -.0032 -0.0005 -.0021 -0.0038 0.0014 
( 0.231) (-0.267) (-0.573) (-0.392) (-0.061) (-0.243) (-0.435) ( 0.163) 
USESTEX -0.0011 -0.0009 -.0013 -0.0011 -0.0010 -0.0018 -0.0013 -0.0011 
(-0. 722) (-0.749) ( -1.084) (-0.880) (-0.826) ( -1.410) (-1.014) (-0.799) 
GE -0.0727 -0.0518 -0.0518 -0.0438 -0.0543 -0.0442 -0.379 -0.0540 
(-4.083) (-3.646) (-3.617) (-2.943) (-3.436) (-2.759) (-2.349) (-3.320) 
TS -0.0014 0.0134 .0143 0.0198 0.0086 0.0150 0.0217 0.0181 
(-0.132) ( 1.203) ( 1.312). ( 1.733) ( o. 724) ( 1.193) ( 1.698) ( 1.403) 
IS -0.0098 -0.0147 -0.0178 -0.0249 -0.0210 -0.0139 -0.0194 -.0130 
(-1.655) (-1.393) (-1.230) (-1.636) (-1.324) (-0.852) (-1.212) (-0.804) 
DUM3 -0.0262 -0.0178 -0.0168 0.0120 -0.0132 0.0362 -0.519 0.0693 
(-1.839) (-1.393) ( -1.279) ( o. 764) (-0.436) ( 1.562) (-1.827) ( 2.848) 
DUM7 -0.0126 0.0085 0.0199 0.0321 0.0163 0.0585 0.0389 .0396 
(-0.750) ( 0.621) ( 1.494) ( 1.954) ( 0.516) ( 2.841) ( 2.534) ( 2.851) 
DUM9 -0.0511 -0.0305 -0.0384 -0.0083 0.0049 0.0420 -0.0383 0.0997 
(-2. 779) (-1.851) (-2.644) (-0.507) (-0.157) ( 1.568) (-1.193) ( 4.338) 
DUM12 -0.0441 -0.0380 -0.0325 -0.0270 -0.0452 0.0214 -0.0556 -0.0939 




0. 7595 0.8315 0.8705 0.8747 .8747 .8753 .8753 0.8700 Total 2R 2/ 
Reg R 3/ 0.6262 0.8315 0.8705 .8747 .8747 .8753 .8753 0.8700 
F(4) - values 4/ 1. 743 2. 7734 4.3617 3.2818 3.9164 3.6060 4.6658 5.6299 
Mean BRt 0.615 .683 • 739 • 789 .843 .890 .935 .983 
1/ t-values are in parentheses. 2/ Includes autoregressive parameters in measurement. U1 
3/ Includes only the structural variables in the model. 4/ F-test for including DUM3,7,9,12. ()) 
59 
the last five rows of Table III and include total R2, regression 
R2, and F-values for the contract month indicator variables as a 
group. The mean basis residual is reported in the last row of the 
table. 
The coefficient of determination (R 2) measures the percent of 
variation in the basis residual (BRt) that is explained by the 
model. Total R2 includes the autoregressive parameter, which 
indicates the order of autocorrelation, in its measurement. To 
illustrate, the total R2 value of .7595, for the one-month period, 
means that 75.95 percent of the variation in the BR(7)t is explained 
by the model. In contrast, regression R2 represents only the given 
model's structural variables. This definitional difference accounts 
for their observed value difference in the one-month model. As a 
note, subtracting regression R2 from total R2 yields the percent 
of variation explained by the autoregressive parameter. In all eight 
of the CPMs, both-sets of the R2 values are high, thus indicating a 
significant amount of the variation in the BRt is explained. 
The F(4)-values report tests for the significance of DUM3, 7, 9, 
and 12 as a group. This is done to determine the existence of 
significant regression for the contract month indicator variables. 
F(4)-values are significant at the .95 percent level in all except the 
one-and-two month models. 
Delineation of each of the thirteen variables' estimated 
relationship to the basis residual is discussed below. The discussion 
will emphasize and interpret the results of the one-month (nearby) 
CPM, as it is probably of most importance to the grain trade. 
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Variables 
Lagged Basis Residual(BRt_ 1l 
Many participants of the wheat industry use the Kansas City HRW 
wheat futures market to maintain long-term hedging positions, which 
are adjusted to meet forward pricing needs. These traders do not play 
the game of jumping in and out of their futures position simply 
because market conditions may be changing slightly. This action is 
left to speculators. Understanding traders• responses to market 
conditions which impact on the basis residual requires recognition of 
the rigidities associated with traders maintaining their futures 
position. 
The basic hypothesis is a partial adjustment process in which the 
fully adjusted basis residual in this period is proportional to the 
basis residual in last period. Thus, BRt is proportional to 
BRt_ 1• The lagged basis residual is included in the model to 
represent this hypothesis. 
The parameter estimates of BRt_ 1, across all eight CPM periods, 
show a consistent to increasing, positive relationship to BRt. The 
estimate's associated t-values are all highly significant. These 
results support the hypothesis that the BRt is proportional to 
BRt_ 1, due to some traders slow adjustment to changing market 
conditions. This relationship is perhaps more fully observed due to 
the use of weekly data. 
The coefficient of BRt_ 1 for the one-month to maturity period 
(nearby) is .6429. This implies that the adjustment coefficient (¢) 
equals 1.36. The interpretation of this is that slightly over 
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one-third of the difference between BR*t and BRt_ 1 is reduced 
during period t. The magnitude of parameter for BRt_ 1 for the 
one-month period is the lowest of all the models. The size of the 
parameter on BRt_ 1 indicates the strength of the rigidites operating 
in the market. As the parameter approaches 1, the adjustment period 
is longer. The results suggest that the longer CPM bases generally 
are more rigid and take longer to adjust to new information. The 
overall results show the partial adjustment hypothesis is supported. 
Market Liquidity(ML) 
As the level of trade commitments increase, the volume of trading 
must be substantial enough, such that participants can enter and exit 
the market without bearing added costs. The analysis indicates that 
the participation and level of activity in the HRW wheat futures 
market, may have a significant effect on the basis in the shorter 
maturity periods. 
The ML regression coefficient for the one-month basis residual, 
BR(1)t, is +.1496, with an associated t-value of 2.764. These 
results suggests that a one percentage point increase in the ratio of 
total volume to total open interest leads to a .15 cent per bushel 
increase in the BR(1)t, ceteris paribus. Conversely, an increase in 
the ratio would result in an increase in the BR(1)t. Implications 
are that lack of speculation in the Kansas City HRW wheat futures 
market, may result in added entry and exit costs for the one-month to 
maturity period. 
The market liquidity variable was not significant at the .05 
level in any of the other models and the signs of the parameters were 
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both positive and negative. It appears in the longer basis periods it 
is possible to enter and exit without encountering liquidity problems. 
Ratio of Current Marketing Year Export Sales 
to Estimated Free Stocks(CMYSALES) 
Current-marketing year export sales is as a ratio of sales to 
free stocks a demand and supply variable. The level of export demand 
is an important determinant of the Gulf price. An increase in CMY 
export demand pushes the Gulf price up relative to the futures price, 
thus increasing the basis residual. This relationship is particularly 
true if the futures price used in calculation of the BRt is beyond 
the current marketing year. Free stocks are those stocks available to 
the market. As free stocks increase, the needed Gulf price to draw 
wheat out of storage is less, causing the basis residual to fall. As 
a ratio, the negative correlation between the two stock variables 
yields a positive impact on the basis residual. 
The CMYSALES coefficients show a strong, positive relationship to 
the basis residual for six of the eight CPM periods. As expected, the 
relationship is less significant in longer months to maturity periods, 
specifically the 4.5 and 8 month periods. The ratio of CMY export 
sales to free stocks clearly reflects a significant relationship to 
the basis residual. 
The estimated regression coefficient of CMYSALES on BR(1)t is 
.2515 with a significant t-value of 2.76. As the ratio of CMY export 
sales to free stocks increase by one percentage point, an accompanying 
decrease of a .25 cent per bushel is expected. If the CMYSALES ratio 
increased 10 percent, then BR(1)t would fall by 2.5 cents per 
bushel, ceteris paribus. 
Difference Between the Gulf Cash 
Price and the Loan Rate(DIFF) 
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DIFF represents a measure of the degree of anticipated loan use. 
As the cash price increases relative to the government's established 
loan rate, DIFF increases. And, the incentive for producers to place 
wheat under loan decreases. As more wheat is available to the free 
market, the Gulf cash price is expected to feel downward pressure, 
consequently decreasing the basis residual. Therefore, DIFF, as a 
measure of anticipated loan use, is inversely related to the basis 
residual. 
The estimated coefficients for all eight CPM periods do not 
confirm the expected relationship of DIFF to the BRt. It appears 
that the effect of tightening free stocks is sufficiently accounted 
for by CMYSALES. 
Actual Average Weekly Exports(ACAVGEX) 
Actual exports at the Gulf are expected to reflect current Gulf 
demand. As actual export levels show an increase, Gulf demand rises 
causing its cash price to rise relative to the futures price. Thus, 
the hypothesized relationship between ACAVGEX and the basis residual 
is positive. ACAVGEX was excluded from the model because it was 
correlated with USESTEX (.8) and with CMYSALES (.5). 
USDA Estimated HRW Wheat Weekly 
Exports{USESTEX) 
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The U. S. Department of Agriculture releases their first report 
of estimated HRW wheat exports early in the marketing year. And 
although market prices react in a similar fashion, export estimates 
are projections for the future of the CMY, thus causing the futures 
price to respond more so than the Gulf cash price. High estimates of 
U. S. exports will entice traders to push the anticipated future cash 
price up relative to the Gulf price. This action-reaction response 
leads to a decrease in the basis residual. 
The statistical coefficients for USESTEX show a consistent, 
negative relationship to the basis residual for all eight CPM periods. 
The range of the coefficients is from -.0009 to -.0018. The estimates 
confirm the expectation that USDA estimated exports are inversely 
associated with the basis residual although the associate t-values are 
not large. 
Grain Embargo{GE) 
The imposition of a U. S. government grain embargo is expected to 
cause export demand at the Gulf to fall. Reflecting the lower demand, 
the Gulf cash bid will decrease relative to the futures price. For 
the 1979 U. S. grain embargo to the Soviet Union, the futures price 
was somewhat supported by the U. S. government's purchases of the 
Soviet Union export commitments. This price squeeze is expected to 
cause the BR{1)t to decrease, as the need to draw wheat to the Gulf 
ports was weakened. 
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The sign and magnitude of the GE coefficients are consistent 
(negative 4 to 7 cents per bushel) and significant across all of the 
CPM periods. However, it must be recognized that the results are 
indicative of the particular Soviet Union embargo and not necessarily 
indicative of all such actions. The implications are that government 
intervention, through embargoes or similar action, which affect the 
short-term or longer-term export demand can significantly impact on 
market prices, causing the basis residual to adjust. 
The coefficient for the estimated impact of the 1979-81 U. S. 
grain embargo to the Soviet Union, for the BR(1)t, is -.0727 with a 
t-value of -4.083. The magnitude of the coefficient indicates that 
the embargo inversely impacted on the BR(1)t by 7.27 cents per 
bushel, ceteris paribus. 
Transportation Situation(TS) 
A short-term disruption in the transporting of HRW wheat to the 
Gulf, due to reasons such as low barge availability or a railroad 
workers strike, will potentially increase the cost of shipping wheat. 
In compensating the seller for this added cost, the Gulf cash price 
will show a short-term increase relative to the futures price and 
consequently, a positive adjustment in the basis residual will occur. 
A positive one to two cent per bushel impact on the BRt is 
consistent and significant across all eight CPM periods. In general, 
the t-values are relatively small with somewhat larger parameters 
estimates and t-values in the longer maturity periods. Two of the 
eight estimates are significant at the .05 level (4 and 7 months to 
maturity). The results hint that cash prices rise relative to more 
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distant futures prices when transportation problems are encountered. 
Inland Storage(IS) 
When inland storage begins to fill up, usually following the 
harvest months, the needed price incentive to draw unstored wheat to 
the Gulf is lowered. Thus, the Gulf cash bid will fall relative to 
the futures price. The futures price, which is an indication of the 
expected future cash price, reflects the anticipation of the wheat 
clearing the market and thus, holds steady to increasing. The result 
is a short-term, somewhat seasonal, decrease in the basis residual. 
The analysis estimates show a negative relationship to hold for 
all eight CPM periods. The t-values are relatively small, however. 
The results do suggest a one to two cent per bushel decline in cash 
prices relative to futures prices when inland storage problems are 
encountered. 
Contract Month Indicator 
Variables(DUM3,7,9,12) 
With a few exceptions, the results support the hypothesis that 
the contract month used to calculate the basis is important in 
determining the basis residual. An anticipated adjustment in the 
BRt intercept can be expected when changing the contract month. 
CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Summary 
Hard-red winter wheat, is a seasonally-produced grain, and thus 
forces the cost efficient firms of the grain industry to maintain 
minimum stock levels. This operational requirement increases the 
amount of absolute price risk that a firm will face. By hedging in 
the futures market, which require full understanding of cash prices, 
futures prices, and their difference, a firm is able to reduce its 
price risk and potentially increase profits. 
Cash prices of HRW wheat are tied by economic and political 
forces to prices of future contracts. Specifically, the cash-future 
price spread (basis) is the market price for the wheat storage service 
and coordinates decision making in the industry. Price determination 
in futures markets has been explained through the "supply of storage••, 
according to which the basis is related to inventory behavior over the 
time horizon. 
The behavior of the basis from the time a hedge is placed until 
the time it is lifted is of considerable importance to the hedger. As 
previously emphasized, the very essence of hedging involves an 
exchange of risk - price level risk for basis risk. It is well 
documented that the variation in the basis is considerably less than 
that of the cash and futures prices. The importance of hedgers 
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understanding the basis and the factors which affect it has led to 
this study. 
The primary purpose of this study is to identify and 
quantitatively estimate the effect of major explanatory variables on 
the Gulf-Kansas City Hard-red winter (HRW) wheat basis. To support 
the research, the underpinnings of basis theory are examined, as are 
the supply/demand factors and governmental influences of this market. 
A constant period to maturity basis residual (basis minus storage 
costs) is hypothesized to be related to the ratio of futures contract 
volume traded to open interest, export sales relative to free stocks, 
USDA estimated exports, average actual exports, imposition of a grain 
embargo, government policies influencing wheat storage, transportation 
problems, inland storage problems, and the contract month used in 
calculating the basis. The basis residual is hypothesized to follow a 
partial adjustment process so that effects of new information are not 
fully reflected in the week when the new information becomes 
available. Data used in the analysis were from January 1979 through 
May 1986. The models are estimated using regression procedures that 
allow for correction of autocorrelation. 
Conclusions and Implications 
The analysis suggest that the weekly hard-red winter wheat basis 
residual is related to the ratio of futures contract volume traded to 
open interest, and negatively related to USDA estimated exports, and 
imposition of a grain embargo. A positive relationship is indicated 
for export sales relative to free stocks. In addition, the contract 
month used in calculating the basis is indicated to significantly 
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affect the basis residual. 
The results show that a substantial amount of the variation in 
the Gulf-Kansas City HRW wheat basis residual (BRt) is explained by 
the specified model. Significant F-test values and R2 values lend 
support to this conclusion. 
The partial adjustment hypothesis is supported and indicates that 
the reaction of traders to new information is not immediately 
reflected in the market, particularly for the longer maturity periods. 
This study provides hard-red winter wheat market participants with a 
better understanding of the Gulf-Kansas City basis. By understanding 
the factors which influence the basis, traders are in a better 
position to make intelligent and potentially profitable marketing 
decisions. Although the magnitude of the variable•s coefficients 
should be interpreted with caution, due to changing market conditions 
and changing degrees of importance, the direction of influence is 
expected to hold. 
Suggestions for Further Research 
A problem remains regarding the appropriate specification of 
transportation costs. The indicator variable included in the model to 
account for transportation problems obviously does not pick up the 
effects that a transportation rate variable would. Transportation 
costs from Kansas City to the Gulf need to be specified and either 
removed from the basis residual or included in the model as an 
explanatory variable. An attempt at quantitatively specifying inland 
storage availability should also improve the explanation power of the 
basis residual model. 
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The results of this analysis suggest that possible market 
liquidity (defined as the ratio of total volume to total open 
interest)problems exist in the HRW futures market. This controversial 
issue needs to be more fully researched. A complete analysis of the 
composition of trader•s commitments (levels of short versus long 
hedging, unbalanced hedging, net speculation) in the Kansas City 
futures market is needed. The analysis should identify the volume of 
trade needed, relative to open interest, to keep participants from 
incurring above normal transaction costs that result out of a thin 
market. 
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